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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
JEROME B. GUINAND,

Plaintiff-Respondent,
and Cross-Appellant,
Case No.

vs.
PAUL T. WALTON and THO.MAS
F. KEARNS, dba ALTONKEARNS,

11153

Defendants-Appellants.

Respondent And Cross - Appellant's Brief
STATEMENT O:F THE KIND OF CASE
Respondent commenced this action seeking to
recover an undivided ten per cent interest in the leasehold interests, overrides, reversionary interests, working
interests, mineral interests and all other assest, including cash, of the partnership known as Walter-Kearns
as of the date he terminated his employment with said
partnership on May 31, 1965, together with an accounting for commissoins due as of said date.

1
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DISPOSITION IN THE LO"\VER COURT
The case was tried below to the Court sitting without a jury. The Court awarded to plaintiff an accounting for commissions earned and not paid, based upon
three per cent of the gross sales price of any mineral
interest or lease sold by plaintiff on behalf of the partnership, Walton-Kearns, together with interest on said
sum from May 31, 1965, as provided by law (R. 5758). The Court also awarded to plaintiff an undivided
ten per cent interest in all leases and mineral interests
held by the partnership, Wal ton-Kearns, as of May 31,
1965, and ordered an accounting to determine the sum
defendants are indebted to plaintiff on the sale of leases
or mineral interests held by the partnership as of May
31, 1965, upon which the defendants have not paid the
plaintiff the sum of ten per cent of the gross sales price
of the said lease or mineral interest ( R. 57-58) . The
Court also held that the writing of January 2, 1962,
was not supported by consideration and is so vague
as to be unenforceable and is not sufficiently definite
as to be construed from its four corners (R. 54).
Appelants, hereinafter referred to as defendants,
appealed from the judgment of the lower court after
denial of their motion for a new trial. Respondent, hereinafter referred to as plaintiff, cross-appealed from the
judgment of the Court below in relation to the various
holdings of the Court in regard to the validity and
enforceability of the writing of January 2, 1962 (R.
72-A and 72-B).

2
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff seeks reversal of that part of the Court's
judgment which holds that the writing of January 2,
1962, is so vague as to be unenforceable and is not sufficiently definite to be construed from its four corners,
and that the said writing is not supported by consideration.
STATEl\IENT OF FACTS
The plaintiff agrees, in general, with the Statement
of Facts set forth in the brief of defendants. However,
that are several points thta plaintiff feels should be
clarified. Therefore, a brief Statement of Facts is
herein set forth.
Prior to the formation of the partnership consisting
of Paul T. Walton and Thomas F. Kearns on November 1, 1955,the plaintiff was employed by Paul T.
Wal ton and engaged generally in activities of a nature
similar to those which were carried on by the partnership after its formation ('Valton deposition, page 5,
lines 10-12, and page 7, lines 1-7). At some date thereafter, it was clearly understood between the plaintiff
and the defendants that he had an interest, at least in
the leases held by the partnership, which interest was
characterized as a two or three per cent carried working
interest ('Valton deposition, page 9, lines 9 through
12). At a later date it was further clearly understood
between the parties that plaintiff had a five per cent
interest, although it is not clear whether or not that
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interest was a carried working interest or some other
type of interest. (Walton deposition, page II, lines
14-22). It further appears, rather clearly, that it was
the intention of the parties that plaintiff was to receive
at least a ten per cent interest in the leases if he terminated, and it would appear that this interest was absolute and not a carried working interest against which
there w~mld be any offset (Walton deposition, page 29,
lines 9 through 17, and page 29, line 30, and page 30,
lines l and 2) (R. 167-68). Although the agreement
dated January 2, 1962, was not, in fact, signed on that
date, it is admitted by all parties that at a prior date a
discussion had been had between the plaintiff and the
defendant Walton to the effect that plaintiff should
have an increased interest in the partnership (R. 175
and R. 154). In March of 1962, when plaintiff was
about to depart to Europe and North Africa on a business trip for the Walton-Kearns partnership, he requested that a writing be given him reflecting his interest
in the assets of Walton-Kearns ( R. 178). He told Mr.
Walton that he had recently been married and that
his wife did not know .what his interest was in the partnership assets, and that he felt that he should have
something in writing before leaving on an extended
trip (R. 179). Pursuant to that request, the defendant
Walton arranged for the drafting of an agreement by
counsel for defendants in this case (R. 179). A meeting
was had the afternoon of March 13, 1962, at which
the defendant, Walton, defendants' counsel, and his
secretary and the plaintiff were present ( R. 179-180).

4
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The rough draft of the agreement, which has been introduced as Exhibit D-4, was furnished to the plaintiff,
as well as to all other persons present ( R. 180). The
plaintiff testified that he made certain changes on Exhibit D-4 as they were dictated by defendants' counsel,
because some of the provisions as set forth in the original
draft did not set forth the full facts and understanding
that plaintiff had had with the defendants (R. 180).
There is dispute in the testimony as to how the final
agreement of January 2, 1962, a_dmitted in evidence
as Exhibit P-3, came into its final form. However, there
is no dispute about the fact that it was signed by both
of the partners, Paul T. \Valton and Thomas F.
Kearns.
After receiving said document, plaintiff remained
in the employment of the partnership for a period of
three years and five months, until he left that employment and went into business for himself. It is undisputed that he had no obligation under the terms of the
writing of January 2, 1962, to continue in the employment of the defendant, 'Valton-Kearns. The defendants
rely heavily upon the original draft of the agreement
of January 2, 1962, as it was interlined by the plaintiff.
However, it is plaintiff's position that the agreement
that is involved, to wit, the final document of January
2, 1962, which was admittedly signed by the partners
in 'Valton-Kearns, is the document which governs in
this situation, and that it is clearly construable from
its four corners and is clearly supported by consideration.

5

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ARGUMENT
POINT I. THE AGREEMENT CAN AND
SHOULD BE CONSTRUED FRO.M ITS FOUR
CORNERS.
The document upon which the action below was
brought and which is in evidence reads as follows:
WALTON KEARNS
Oil and Gas Properties
1205 Walker Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Empire 4-4333
January 2, 1962
Mr. Jerome B. Guinand
5623 Indian Rock Road
Salt Lake City, Utah
Dear Mr. Guinand:
This letter is to confirm your ownership of an
undivided ten per cent (IO%) interest in WALTON -KEARNS, a co-partnership composed of
Paul T. Walton and Thomas F. Kearns. This
interest includes and is not in addition to the
various interests from time to time heretofore
acquired by you.
Upon termination of your employment with
the partnership for any cause whatsoever, your
interest in the partnership will be determined
and discharged as of said time without resulting
in a dissolution of the partnership; and such interest as may have theretofore been vested in you
in specific properties shall become your separate

6
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property, subject to adjustments incident to your
proportionate share of the then partnership indebtedness.

Isl Paul T. Walton
Isl Thomas F. Kearns
Although the document bears the date of January
2, 1962, by admission of all of the parties it was, in fact,
executed and delivered at a later date and was backdated to January 2, 1962 (Walton deposition, page
13, lines 4 through 18, and page 25, lines 12 through
14). (R. 154 and R. 178-180). There is no dispute
that plaintiff had been an employee of 'Valton-Kearns,
a co-partnership composed of Paul T. Walton and
Thmoas F. Kearns, since 1955 (Walton deposition,
page 5, lines 13 and 14) . It is further not disputed
that he acquired various interests in the partnership
between 1955 and January 2, 1962 (Walton deposition,
page 9, lines 9 through 12, and page 12, lines 6 through
21) (R. 158, 159). The agreement of January 2, 1962,
also refers to the interest that the plaintiff had previously
acquired in the partnership. It is also undisputed that
the plaintiff remained in the employment of the partnership from the year 1955 until May 31, 1965, or for a
period of approximately three years and five months
after the date of the agreement which is the basis of
this actoin, without any obligation in law or in fact to
do so, and that immediately prior to January 2, 1962,
or at such other date as the agreement was, in fact,
entered into, he was employed by the co-partnership
under an oral agreement without any terminattion

7
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date, and also without any obligation to continue said
employment.
The agreement of January 2, 1962, seems to be
composed of rather simple language, which is not complicated and should be construed on its face.
The only possible conflict that can be found in the
agreement is between the following two portions:
"This letter is to confirm your ownership of an
undivided ten per cent ( 10%) interest in WAL-

TON-KEARNS . . . "

(found in paragraph 1) and

"Upon termination of your employment with
the partnership for any cause whatsoever your
interest in the partnership will be determined
and discharged as of that date ... "
In interpreting the meaning of this letter, there
are certain standards and rules of interpretation that
require, among other things, that if at all possible a
construction of the agreement be reached which effects
a valid contract. This principle is enunciated in Driggs
v. Utah State Teachers Retirement Board, 105 Utah
417, 142 P. 2d 657 (1943) at 663, in which the Court,
quoting from Schofield v. Zi~n's C.M.I., 85 Utah 281,
39 P .2d 342, 96 ALR 1038 ( 1934) , states as fallows:
"It is elemental, in construing a contract, that
its purpose, its nature, and subject matter should
be considered. A construction giving an instrument a legal effect to accomplish its purpose will
be adopted when it can reasonably be done, and

8
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between two possible constructions that will be
adopted which establishes a valid contract."
The Utah Courts have also adopted the commonly
accepted rule that the ordinary and usual meanings of
the words contained in a contract must be applied thereto in construing it. Plain City Irrigation Company vs.
Hooper Irrigation Company, 11Utah2d 188, 356 P. 2d
625 (1960), recognizes this principle and the Court says
as follows at page 627 of the Pacific Reporter:
"The beginning point of interpretation of a
contract is an examination of the language used
in accordance with the ordinary and usual meaning of the words used, and in case of uncertainty,
the background circumstances may be looked
to."
It is also said in that case at page 628 as follows:
"Generally, where there is doubt about the interpretation of a contract, a fair and equitable
result will be preferred over a harsh or unreasonable one. And an interpretation that will produce
an inequitable result will be adopted only where
the contract so expressly and unequivocally so
provides that there is no other reasonable interpretation to be given it."

The whole of the agreement must be considered
and effect must be given to the entire agreement, if at
all possible. See Gates v. Daynes, 3 Utah 2d 95, 279
P. 2d 458 (1955) at page 462 of the Pacific Reporter,
where the Court states:
"The contract is not artfully drawn and ap-

9
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pears to have been clrawn without outside assistance. We are permitted only to construe the contract so as to give effect to the entire agreement
without ignoring any part thereof."
In this same connection, it was said in Cornwall
vs. Willow Creek Country Club, 13 Utah 2d 160, 369
P. 2d 928 ( 1962), in construing the meaning of a contract:
"In interpreting a contract, the primary rule
is to determine what the parties intended by what
they said. The court may not add, ignore or discard words in the process, but attempts to render
certain the meaning of the provision in dispute
by an objective and reasonable construction of
the whole contract."
Although the word "said" is used, the contract in
question was in writing.

A case of great interest herein is Maw v. Noble,
IO Utah 2d 440, 354 P. 2d 121 (1960), in which it is

recognized that, if there is uncertainty or ambiguity,
the contract should be strictly construed against the
drawer, but that before that rule is reached the Court
must look realistically at the contract in the light of
the circumstances surrounding its coming into existence
and give effect to the intent of the parties, if it can
be reasonably ascertained. This proposition is set forth
m the following language from that case:
"It may be a source of regret to the parties
that the contract did not expressly state how the
interest was to be handled. Not having done so,
in adjusting the rights of the parties, it is neces-

10
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sary to resort to established rules relating to
the interpretation of contracts. We are in agreement with the well-recognized rule urged by the
defendants that where there is uncertainty or
ambiguity the contract should be construed
against him who draws it. But it is to be kept
in mind that this rule applies only where there
is some genuine lack of certainty, and not so
strained or merely fanciful or wishful interpretations that may be indulged in. The primary
and a more fundamental rule is that the contract
must be looked at realistically in the light of the
circumstances under which it was entered into,
and if the intent of the parties can be ascertained
with reasonable certainty it must be given effect."
In the event there are two apparently conflicting
provisions, which is not admitted by the plaintiff, but
which is contended in this case by the defendants, the
rule set forth in H ardinge vs. Eimco, 1 Utah 2d 320,
266 P. 2d 492 ( 1954), should be followed:

"It is fundamental that if effect can be given
to both of two apparently conflicting provisions
in a reasonable reconciliation that interpretation
will control. 'Villiston on Contracts, sec. 622."
A most recent case, Seal vs. Tayco, Inc., 116 Utah
2d 323, 400 P. 2d 503 ( 1965), contains a discussion
which is apropos here. The Court was addressing itself
to the problem of interpretation of a contract in which
there were conflicting clauses and admittedly one of
them was later in the contract, but also in small print.
However, the principle remains the same. The Court
there said:
11
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"In addressing this problem, certain principles
should be kept in mind. The first is that in case
of uncertainty as to the meaning of the contract
it should be construed most strictly against its
framer, Amsco. A particularized application of
this well-recognized doctrine is that it seems
manifestly unfair to permit one who formulates
a contract to so fashion it as to mislead the other
party by setting forth a clearly apparent promise
or representation in order to induce acceptance,
and then designedly 'burying' elsewhere in the
document, in fine print, provisions which purport
to limit or take away the promise, and/or preclude recovery for failure to fulfill it."
In Morgan vs. Child Cole and Company, 41 Utah
562, 128 P. 521 (1912), this Court interpreted a contract which was no less certain than the contract in
question. In that case the plaintiff and defendant had
entered into a written agreement that provided that
the plaintiff should furnish the defendant information
" ... concerning the property known as the Sioux Consolidated Mining Company ... " and that the defendant
should purchase " ... about 40,000 shares of the capital
stock of said company, or an investment of not to
exceed $15,000.00 ... " and to equally divide the profits
and share the loss. The defendant in that case urged
the agreement was ambiguous and could not be enforced. The Court held the agreement did not contain
an incurable ambiguity.
In Pelton's Spudnuts vs. Doane, 120 Utah 366,
234 P. 2d 852 (1951), this Court was faced with the
question of whether a franchise contract which pro-

12
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vided that five per cent of the gross spudnuts sales of
the defendant should be spent for advertising, with
21/2 per cent to be paid by the plaintiff and 21/2 per
cent to be paid by the defendant, was too indefinite and
uncertain to be enforced. The defendant did not pay
any sum for the advertising, and on trial the lower
court held that the provision was void on its face as
"too indefinite and uncertain" and that it was unenforceable. On appeal, this Court held that the provision
was neither indefinite or uncertain, and reversed for
a new trial on other issues. Thus, this very Court has
held that a percentage determination or formula for
determining the amount to be paid in a given situation
is not so indefinite or uncertain as to make an agreement
unenforceable or ambiguous.
Applying the above standards of construction to
the agreement, and in particular to the language of
the agreement most recently quoted above, the last part
of which the defendants contend to be vague or unenforceable, it becomes apparent that the first sentence
confirms to the plaintiff his ownership of ten per cent
in Walton-Kearns. The second sentence merely designates the time the value of that interest will be computed. At the time the agreement was entered into, it
obviously would not have been possible to determine
the dollar value of the ten per cent interest because the
business was to be continued from and after that date,
and its assets and liabilities would, without doubt,
change. The only reasonable interpretation that can
be placed upon the agreement is that at the time of
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the termination of plaintiff's employment the assets
and liabilities of Walton-Kearns would be determined,
the latter subtracted from the former, and ten per cent
of that figure resulting is the value of the plaintiff's
interest. The contentioa of defendants that the agreement is vague .'.md unenforceable because there is no
standard fixing or governing its meaning is absolutely
negated by the language of the agreement itself. The
standard as set forth therein is ten per cent of the assets,
after deducting from the assets the partnership indebtedness as of the date of termination of employment
of the plaintiff. Applying the rules of interpretation
set forth herein to the plain language of the agreeme:r:it,
it becomes obvious that there is no need of an additional standard and that the agreement carries with
it all of the necessary elements for computing the defendants' obligation to the plaintiff. Therefore, on the
basis of the written instrument itself, judgment should
be awarded in favor of plaintiff and against defendants,
requiring an accounting based upon the determination
of the assets of the partnership as of the date of the
termination, less the partnership indebtedness, and ten
per cent of said amount should be the value of plaintiff's interest.

POINT II. THE AGREEMENT IS SUPPORTED BY ADEQUATE CONSIDERATION.
In regard to the language of the agreement above
set forth, it should be specifically noted that the first

14
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sentence reads, in part, as follows:
"This letter is to confirm your ownership of an
undivided ten per cent ( 10 3) interest in Walton-Kearns ... " (emphasis added)
The document does not say that it specifically conveys,
but speaks in terms of confirming, which by clear implication means that it is reducing to writing a prior
agreement between the parties. Now, it matters not
whether we speak of consideration for the written
document or whether we speak of consideration for the
prior agreement between the parties which was reduced
to the writing dated January 2, 1962. At least a portion
of the consideration in either instance is the same, to wit:
Guinand's remaining in the employment of WaltonKearns. The defendants contend and the Court below
was in error in holding that, without a term or tenure
written into the contract, the plaintiff was free to terminate at any time and thus gave no consideration for the
ten per cent interest plaintiff received. The law is quite
to the contrary, and the Court's attention is directed to
35 Am. Jur. Section 12.1, found at page 37 of the 1968
supplement, which says in part as follows:
"It is elementary that the parties to a contract
of employment, if they act upon a sufficient consideration while the contract remains executory
and before a breach of it occurs, may by a new
and later agreement rescind it in whole or in
part, alter or modify it in any respect, add to or
supplement it, or replace it by a substitute. The
latter agreement which may properly be called
the secondary agreement, may be either one of

15
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two different kinds: ( l) it may merely alter,
modify or qualify the original agreement, or
( 2) it may entirely supersede the original agreement ... It has been variously held that the following consideration moving from the employee
to the employer is sufficient to support a secondary agreement of employment; ... the continuance of the employee in the services of his employer where he was under no contractual obligation to remain ... Warren v. Mosher, 31 Ariz.
33, 250 P. 354, 49 ALR 1311; Spicer v. Earl,
41 Mich. 191, l NW 923, 32 Am. Rep. 152; Roberts v Mays Mills, 184 NC 406, 114 S.E. 530,
28 ALR 338; Scott v. J. F. Duthie & Co., 125
Wash. 470, 216 P. 853, 28 ALR 328; Long v.
Forbes, 58 Wyo. 533, 136 P.2d 242, 158 ALR
224." (emphasis added)
In this situation, assuming the defendants' contentions to be correct, that is, that plaintiff had no obligation to continue in the employment after the agreement
conveying the ten per cent to him was reached, the above
authority clearly meets that situation and holds that
the fact that he did continue in the employment is consideration to support the employment agreement. He
obviously had no obligation to continue in defendants'
employ before the January 2, 1962 agreement. See
Counter-Affidavit of defendant Walton dated February 24, 1966, as follows:
"That the plaitniff in the instant action had
the right to terminate his employment with 'i\T alton-Kearns at will, and that the writing of J anuary 2, 1962, in no way altered, changed or committed him to any tenure of employment with
Walton-Kearns." (R. 21-22)

16
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The same rule is found in an annotation in 158
ALR at 242, Section 4, in which all of the cases to that
date are collected. The case to which the above annotation is made is Long v. Forbes, 58 Wyo. 533, 136 P.
2d 242 ( 1943), and is almost identical to the instant
case. In that case there had been a contract to pay an
employee an additional $50.00 per month, to be held
for him until the termination of the contract, and the
Court held against a contention that there was no consideration for defendant's promise to pay the additional
$50.00 per month as follows:
"An employment of this sort which is terminable at any time is subject to modification at
any moment by either party as a condition of_its
continuing at all. (Citing numerous cases and
the Restatement of Contracts, Section 76, comments ( c) ) . . . The doing of anything beyond
what one is already bound to do, though of the
same kind, and in the same transaction, may be
a good consideration. Pollock on Contract, 10th
Ed., 181; "\Villison on Contracts, Revised Ed.,
Section 102A."
In a California case, Sabatini v. Hensley, 161 Cal.
2d 172, 326 Pac. 2d 622, (1958), a situation very similar to the case at bar arose. In the Sabatini case, a for-:
mer employee sued his former employer, seeking a bonus
above his salary that had been promised by the employer. As in the instant case, there was no obligation
for the employee to continue the employment. The
Court held as follows:
"'Vhen an employer promises a prospective
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employee a fixed salary and an indeterminate
bonus, each promise is made to induce undertaking of the employment. Acceptance of the employment is consideration for the promise of a
bonus, and this promise is enforceable . . . . We
see no distinction where, as here, the promise is
made after employment but is made to an employee who has not contracted to serve for a fixed
term, and for the purpose of inducing him to
remain an employee. Here no period of employment was specified.
"Continuing an employment to which one is
not bound by contract is as clearly consideration
as is entering into the employment in the first
place."
In Sabatini, there was no specific amount specified
according to the evidence, and the California Supreme
Court held that failure to specify the amount or a
formula for determining the amount to be paid does
not render the contract too indefinite for enforcement,
because under California law the standard is reasonable worth pursuant to a California statute. In the
instant case, we need not go to the extent of attempting
to prove the value that was promised because there is
a formula established, to wit: Ten per cent of all of
the assets of the partnership, less ten per cent of the
then partnership indebtedness, as of the date of termination of employment.
We submit the cases above cited support the proposition that the action of the plaintiff herein in continuing in the employment of the defendant for a period of
three years and five months after the date of the agree-
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ment is consideration for the promise made by the
defendants.
The above discussion should lay at rest any contention that the arrangement evidence by the writing
of January 2, 1962, by which plaintiff received the ten
per cent interest in the partnership and continued in
its employment is not supported by consideration. The
case cited above, Long v. Forbes, supra, specifically
noted and relied upon the Restatement of Agency for
the proposition that employment without a term or
tenure is employment terminable at any time. To thi~
same effect also see 161 ALR at 709, where it is quoted
with approval from the Restatement of Agecny, Vol. 2,
Section 422, as follows:
"Unless otherwise agreed contractual promises by principal and agent to employ and to serve
create obligations to employ and to serve which
are terminable upon notice by either party."
This ALR annotation goes on to say:
"Since the rule is completely undisputed and
supported by literally hundreds of cases, it has
not been necessary to state any of the cases in
detail."
This rule, of course, by implication holds that the
contract between the employer and employee is a valid
contract, but that the services of the employee may be
terminated by either employee or employer at any time,
but, of course, that does not alter the consideration that
the employee is to receive for the employment.
Additional consideration here involved revolves
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around the fact that the plaintiff had a prior interest in
the partnership, or even assuming the position of
the defendants, a five per cent interest in the leases
that Walton-Kearns held prior to the agreement reflected by the writing of January 2, 1962. See Walton's deposition of February 4, 1966, page 12, line
13. By that writing of January 2, 1962, the plaintiff
gave up that interest in exchange for the interest set
forth in that writing. The Court's attention is drawn
to the writing of January 2, 1962, where it is said in
the second !)entence of the first paragraph:
"This interest includes and is not in addition
to the various interests from time to time heretofore acquired by you."
This is plainly consideration and is set forth on the
face of the instrument.
POINT III. THE WRITTEN AGREEMENT
SHOULD BE INTERPRETED IN THE
LIGHT OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES UNDER
WHICH IT WAS ENTERED INTO, AND EFFECT GIVEN TO THE INTENT OF THE
PARTIES.
The heading sets forth the rule found in Maw v.
Noble (supra) . Although there is conflict in the evidence as to how the final draft of the writing of January
2, 1962, came into effect, there is more than sufficient
evidence to believe that it was drafted by the attorney
for the defendants. In the deposition of the defendant,
Walton, taken January 4, 1966, at page 13, lines 19
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and 20, is found the following:
"Q. Now, do you recall who prepared that agreement 1 (The agreement of January 2, 1962).
"A. Yes, l\ilr. Gustin prepared it."
It should be remembered that the above quotation
from the mouth of the defendant, Walton, was taken
at the time that the first deposition was taken in this
matter, to wit: in February of 1966. Subsequently, at
the time of trial, Mr. Walton stated that he had asked
his attorney, Mr. Gustin,

" ... as to how to go about giving Mr. Guinand
as close to a partnership interest as we possibly
could, that is being a partner, Mr. Gustin evolved
this typewritten letter of January 2." ( R. 156)
And subsequently the defendant, Walton, testified
that Mr. Guinand made some changes in the original
draft of the document as prepared by the defendants'
attorney and presented it to Mr. Walton, who informed
the plaintiff that if it was all right with Mr. Gustin,
it was all right with the defendant. The defendant Walton states that thereafter the plaintiff went to Mr. Gustin's office and returned to the office of the defendants,
where he had the document of January 2, 1962 typed by
one of the secretaries and handed it to Mr. Walton, who
signed it and who also procured the signature of Mr.
Kearns. (R. 162-63)
In conflict with this testimony is the testimony
of the plaintiff, who stated that in March of 1962 the
Exhibit D-4, which is the interlined original draft of
the final agrement of January 2, 1962, was presented

21

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

to him at a meeting at which the plaintiff, Walton,
hi.s attorney, .Mr. Gustin, and a secretary in Mr. Gustin's
office were present, and that upon receiving the original
draft, some discussions were had regarding the fact
the original draft did not set forth the understanding
that the plaintiff had had with Mr. Walton ( R. 124125). The plaintiff then testified that after discussing
the matter for a while in l\ir. Gustins' office, Mr. Gustin, defendants' attorney, dictated the changes and that
the plaintiff wrote them in on his copy. He also stated
that a copy of the document was available to all of
those who were meeting at that time (R. 125). Contrary to the assertions of counsel for the defendant, the
only testimony in the record under oath regarding the
drafting of the agreement as to the fact that the plaintiff was told that it was simply an agreement to agree
in the future is that of the plaintiff, where he denies
on cross-examination that he was told that the agreement would require another agreement when he terminated his employment (R. 126).
Walton admits in his testimony that plaintiff had
advised him that he wished a writing to reflect his interests in the assets of the partnership, because he had
recently been married and was about to undertake a
trip overseas for the partnership, and desired something
to protect his wife's interests in the event that anything
might occur to the plaintiff (R. 160). The plaintiff,
in testifying as to how the agreement of January 2,
1962, came into existence, stated that he had told Mr.
Walton that, since he had recently been married and
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his wife did not know what his interest was in WaltonKearns, he felt he should have something in writing
before he left on an extended trip for the partnership,
and that Walton agreed (R. 179).
The plaintiff further testified that at the meeting
held in March of 1962, out of which the agreement
dated January 2, 1962 was developed, he wrote the
changes as dictated by the defendants' attorney on the
copy that had been furnished to him (R. 125 and R.
181-182). He read those changes and was asked by Mr.
Gustin if it was satisfactory. He further stated that
he said as follows, "I guess it is, as long as it gives me
an undivided ten per cent interest in everything Walton-Kearns has," and that Mr. Gustin said to him,
"Isn't that what it says?'', to which the plaintiff replied,
"I guess so," and that there was no further conversation
at that time regarding the agreement (R. 182). The
plaintiff also testified, which testimony is undisputed
in the record by any statement under oath, that he at
no time had any conversation with anybody in regard
to the agreement of January 2, 1962, wherein it was
described to him as an agreement to agree in the future
(R. 186).
It would thus appear without doubt that the plaintiff had asked the defendants for a writing setting forth
an understanding which had been arrived at between
the parties at an earlier date, that is, earlier than J anuary 2, 1962, but that the meeting at which the writing
was finally developed did not occur until the middle
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of March, 1962. It also appears without dispute that
the plaintiff had advised the defendant Walton that
the reason he wished such a writin¥ was to protect his
wife, who had no knowledge of his interest in the assets
of Walton-Kearns, due tothe fact that he, the plaintiff,
was embarking upon an extended trip out of the country on behalf of the partnership.
It would seem to be an absolute exercise in futility
for the plaintiff to insist upon a writing and then to
accept it if he were advised that the agreement was
simply an agreement to agree in the future, or, in the
alternative, that it meant nothing, as alleged by Walton
when he testified as follows on cross-examination:

"Q. Did you talk to Mr. Gustin or anybody else
before you signed it, after it had been drafted in final form?
"A. Yes.
"Q. You called Mr. Gustin, did you?

"A. I don't know whether I called him or talked
to him in his office.
"Q. But you did talk to him about that agreement?

"A. Yes.
"Q. And after receiving advice from Mr. Gustin

or consulting with him in regard to it, you
were willing to sign it?
"A. Yes. Mr. Gustin told me that the agreement did not mean a darn thing anyway,
that we would have to have a final agree-
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ment when and if Jerry ever quit, so it did
not mean anything to sign it." ( R. 163164)

Following the rule set forth in Maw v. Noble
(supra) earlier quoted to the effect that the agreement
must be looked at realistically in the light of the circumstances under which it was entered into, and if the
intent of the parties can be ascribed with reasonable
certainty, it must be given effect, it does not comport
with good judgment or with the normal behavior of
human beings to go to the extent of coming to an agreement between the parties, spend the time and effort
necessary to draft a document, have a meeting in regard
to it in which it is re-drafted, have it signed and then
deliver it, if the parties at the time did not intend that
the agreement meant what it stated on its face. At
the time the agreement was entered into, obviously,
the plaintiff and defendants were at least in theory acting in good faith, a fact which Walton admits (Walton
deposition page 30, line 24-25). If at that time they
were, in fact, acting in good faith, then Walton or his
counsel had an obligation to advise plaintiff that the
agreement meant nothing, which, of course, as noted
above, would be completely contrary to normal business
practices and human experience where plaintiff was
seeking an agreement which would protect his wife.
Thus, it must be concluded that either the defendants
were not acting in good faith and intended to mislead
the plaintiff, or the agreement means what it states on
its face.
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Thus it is urged that when the agreement of J anuary 2, 1962, is examined in the light of the circumstances
surrounding its drafting, it becomes clear that the parties intended to grant plaintiff a ten per cent interest
in the assets of Walton-Kearns, less ten per cent of
the partnership indebtedness as of the date he left the
employment of Walton-Kearns.
Any other interpretation of the undisputed facts
surrounding the creation of the agreement would simply
not comport with and, in fact, would be diametrically
opposed to the expressed intentions of the parties in
drafting said agreement.

POINT IV. THE DISPUTED PORTIONS
OF THE AGREEMENT SHOULD BE MOST
STRICTLY CONSTRUED AGAINST THE
DEFENDANTS.
Assuming that the Court finds there is an ambiguity in the document as urged by the defendants, the
amiguity arises from language admittedly a part of
the original draft, which is Exhibit D-4, which was prepared by defendants' counsel (Walton deposition, page
13, lines 19 and 20). The language which plaintiff urges
grants him a ten per cent interest in the assets of Walton-Kearns reads as follows:
"This letter is to confirm your ownership of
an undivided ten per cent interest in WaltonKearns, a co-partnership composed of Paul T.
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and

Walton and Thomas F. Kearns"
"Upon termination of your employment with
the partnership for any cause whatsoever, your
interest in the partnership business will be determined. . . "

This language is contained in both the original draft
and the final signed agreement of January 2, 1962,
which is Exhibit P-3, and was the creation of defendants' counsel. The balance of the language which was
the changes shown on Exhibit D-4 and which, along
with the quotations above, was incorporated into the
final agreement, the plaintiff states was dictated to him
by Mr. Gustin, the defendants' attorney, at a conference where the original draft was being discussed (R.
124-125).

Even assuming that the plaintiff authored the interlineations, which plaintiff denies, nevertheless, the
active or vital portions of the agreement are those
which were originally the language of defendants'
counsel, and under the rule found in Maw vs. Noble
(supra) should be most strictly construed against the
defendants.
If the Court finds that the other portions of the
agreement were, in fact, the creation of the plaintiff,
he is willing to have them most strictly construed
against him because they are the portions which protect
Walton-Kearns, and plaintiff has no argument with
being bound by them. By the same token, the granting
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or vital portions of the agreement are those above quoted
and should be most strictly construed against the defendants under the same rule.

POINT V. TIIE RECORD CLEARLY SUPPORTS THE AWARD TO THE PLAINTIFF
OF A TEN PER CENT INTEREST IN ALL OF
THE LEASES, LEASEHOLDS AND MINERAL INTERESTS HELD BY THE PARTNERSHIP, AS OF THE DATE OF TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT.
In spite of defendants' position raising numerous
technicalities regarding the parol evidence rule, the
pre-trial order and the Statute of Frauds, it is the
contention of the plaintiff that the defendants have
clearly admitted as a matter of fact, under oath, that
the very least that they have always recognized that
plaintiff had a claim to was ten per cent of all the
mineral interests, leaseholds and leases of the partnership. See Walton deposition, page 29, lines 9 through
30, and page 30, lines I through 15, where, in response
to questions regarding the defendant Walton's intention
as to what the plaintiff would receive, if anything, at
the time he terminated his employment with the partnership, Mr. Walton said:
"Yes, JVIr. Guinand was to receive a ten per
cent interest in the leases, most of which he already had his interest carved out by being
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and,

a record title owner."
"If I understand the question correctly, Mr.
Guinand' s interest would be ten per cent in the
leases Walton-Kearns held at the time he left
employment."

See also the questions and answers as follows, found
at page 30, lines 9 through 15:
"Q. Let me rephrase it. As I understand your
answer to my last question, if Mr. Guinand
quit before there were production profits after expenses, your intention was he would
have a ten per cent interest in the leases
then held, that is, on the date of termination, by Walton-Kearns?

"A. That is absolutely true. We went along on
that from the very beginning."
The same type of questioning was engaged in at
the time of the trial of this case, and Walton admitted
that, at the very least, even under his understanding of
the agreement as he alleged it to be as of the time of
trial, which apparently was changed from the time of
the taking of his deposition, that the plaintiff was entitled to ten per cent of all the leasehold interests (R.
167-168). Referring to the agreement of January 2,
1962, Walton said as follows:
"A. After this date there was no question. We
have never quibbled on this.
"Q. That is regardless of whose name it was in?

"A. Right.
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"Q. If he was the holder of record, ninety per
cent belonged to the partnership and ten
cent belonged to him?

"A. In theory, yes.
"Q. And exactly the opposite was the situation,
too, if it was all in your name, ten per cent
belonged to him?

"A. That was the general situation.

"Q. Upon dissolution - not a dissolution, upon
the termination of Mr. Guinand' s employment with the company, is it not true that
ten per cent would have been the figure that
would have been used to determine whatever
interest he had? I am not talking about
whether it is net or gross, or whether you
deduct anything from it or anything of the
sort. I am just asking you, on whatever
basis the division was to be made, his interest was fixed at ten per cent by this
agreement in your mind?

"A. Yes."
(R. 167-168)
At approximately the time that the oral agreement
which resulted in the written agreement of January 2,
1962, was entered into, the plaintiff began taking leases
on behalf of the partnership, with the consent of the
defendants, showing in most instances that the plaintiff
held a ten per cent interest in the leases (R. 175-178).
Prior to the time that the agreement to increase the
plaintiff's interest to ten per cent was reached, most
of the leases were taken showing plaintiff to have a
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five per cent interest (R. 175). This fact is admitted
by the defendant Walton (R. 157-158).
It, therefore, becomes very clear from the testimony of the defendant Walton himself, as well as
that of the plaintiff, that the award of the ten per cent
interest in the minerals, mineral interests, leases and
leasehold interests of the partnership to the plaintiff,
as awarded by the Court below, is perfectly justified
and supported by the evidence. If a reversal of that
award were made, assuming the Court does not agree
with plaintiff's proposition that the agreement itself
provides that he is entitled to the ten per cent, upon a
new trial below, it is difficult to see how the defendant
could avoid the testimony above quoted and found in
the record, which states the very position that the Court
below found, to wit: that the plaintiff had always been
regarded as the owner of, and was entitled to, a ten
per cent interest in all of the minerals, mineral interests,
leases and leaseholds held by the partnership as of the
date of the plaintiff's termination with the partnership.

POINT VI. THE DEFENDANTS CANNOT
RAISE ON APPEAL QUESTIONS NOT
RAISED IN THE PLEADINGS OR AT THE
TRIAL.
Assuming, but not agreeing, that the writing which
is the basis of plaintiff's action is not a sufficient writing
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to satisfy the provisions of the Statute of Frauds, which
plaintiff urges is a sufficient writing, nevertheless, the
defendants at this late date cannot raise the requirement
of a writing under the Statute of Frauds. This matter
was neither contained within the pleadings nor the pretrial order, and was raised for the first time by the defendants' Motion for a New Trial or, in the Alternative,
for Amendments of the Judgment and Other Relief,
dated November 9, 1967 (R. 61-65). This Court has
for so long held and has been so consistent in doing
so that matters not raised in the pleadings nor put in
issue at trial will not be considered on appeal, that to
cite all of said cases would be mere redundancy. However, the Court recently in the case entitled In Re
Estate of Ekker, 19 Utah 2d 44, 432 P. 2d 45 (1967),
said of two points made on that appeal as follows:
"Neither of the first two points were raised in
the pleadings nor put in issue at the trial. Therefore, they cannot be considered for the first time
on this appeal." Citing Westerfield vs. Coop,
6 Utah 2d 262, 3ll P. 2d 787; Delores Uranium
Corp. v. Jones, 14 Utah 2d 280, 263 P. 2d 883;
Nielson, et al. vs. Eisen, II6 Utah 343, 209 P.2d
928.
Two other cases to the same effect not cited above art'
Huber v. Deep Creek Irrigation Co., 6 Utah 2d 15,
305 P. 2d 478 (1956) and Hamilton vs. Salt Lake
County Sewage Improvement District No. 1, 15 Utah
2d 216, 390 P. 2d 235 ( 1964), where the Court said,
at 236:
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"We need not canvass matters raised for the
first time on appeal."
and cited therefor North Salt Lake vs. St.Joseph Water
Company, 118 Utah 600, 223 P. 2d 577 (1950); In Re
State in Interest of Woodward, 14 Utah 2d 336, 384 P.
2d 110 (1963).

CONCLUSION

It is respectfully urged that this Court can and
should on this appeal find that the agreement of January
2, 1962, is a complete agreement between the parties
and can be construed from its face, and that it is supported by consideration. The consideration is implicit
on the face of the agreement where it is stated:
"This interest includes and is not in addition
to the various interests from time to time heretofore acquired by you."
In addition, consideration is furnished by the admitted fact that the plaintiff remained in the employment of the defendants for a period of three years and
five months after the date of the agreement, without
any contractual obligation to do so. The agreement
contains within it a formula for determining the interest
to which the plaintiff is entitled, to wit: he is entitled to
ten per cent of the assets of Walton-Kearns as of the
date of his leaving the employment of Walton-Kearns,
less ten per cent of the then partnership indebtedness.
Upon making such a finding, this Court sets at rest all
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of the contentions raised by the appellants.
If the Court cannot construe the agreement from
its four corners, then the plaintiff respectfully urges
that the record is replete with enough evidence to construe the agreement in the same manner and to the
same eff cct as urged above.

The plaintiff further contends that the evidence
within the record is sufficient to sustain the trial Court's
finding that he was entitled to at least a ten per cent
interest in all of the mineral interests, leases, leaseholds,
reversionary interests, working interests and overrides
of the partnership as of the date of his termination,
and further urges that under the well-established rule
of law as provided by this Court, the question of the
Statute of Frauds cannot be raised at this late date
for the first time.
Plaintiff also contends that there has been sufficient
partial performance on his part, that is, the remaining
in the employment of the defendants, to take any agreement that might have required a writing out of the
Statute of Frauds.
The judgment below should be affirmed in relation
to the award to the plaintiff of his commissions which
are not in dispute on appeal and the award to him of
the ten per cent mineral interests, which award should
be merged into an award reversing the decision below
in regard to the enforceability of the agreement of
January 2, 1962, which agreement should be construed
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and enforced by this Court and the cause remanded
solely for an accounting under the terms of the agreement of January 2, 1962, and an accounting for the
commissions which are not in dispute on this appeal.

Respectfully submitted,

Richard H. Moffat
1311 Walker Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Attorneys for Plaintiff-Respondent
and Cross-Appellant
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